r-oecomnomics, a iarge number-of economists argued that deficit spending was required to achieve two of the stated national econonnic objectives: frill ennployment and a high r-ate of econonnic gr'owtln.' Society was thotnght to bemnefit fr-ornn deficit spendiing because of tine reduction in lost output arnd because tine econornw would achieve a higher n-ate of gr-owth.
produce net benefits for society as a whoie. The purpose of tinis paper-is to examinne sornie of tine arguments amnd evidemnce on wlnether deficit spendirng yields net benefits to society. D.EFICiTSPE~NlMNG: SOME. KEY
TER.M S
Tine phr-ases ''deficit spendirng' amnd ''fiscal policy'' ar-e not necessamilv symnomnynnous. Wlniie deficit spendimng is a pai-ticimiar fiscal policy actiorn, riot all 'One of Keynes' initial arguments was that saving would exceed investment at a level of output consistent with the full employment of labor. That is, the US. savings rate was too high. The view that the budget should be in persistent deficit was termed the "new fiscal policy." To see how opinions about deficit spending have changed in two decades, compare the deficit discussions in Levy (1963) with those in Levy, et, al. (1984) .
concept of the natural rate of unemployment. For a discussion of these issues, see Modigliani (1986b) , Blinder (1986) and Laidler (1988) .
'For a discussion of the potential harmful effects of the public debt, see Bruce and Purvis (1986) , Barro (1987) and Levy, et. a). (1984) .
'The once-common view that the market economy cannot sustain full-employment equilibrium has given way to the fiscai pohcv actions pi-oduce or-involve deficits,F ol exampie, the goven-nnnent couid devise a policy wher-ehy expenditures and taxes an-c chainged by tine same annount. This weil-kmnown "baiarnced budget" oper-ation affects aggregate demarnd, because the change in gover-nnnernt expenditur-es affects aggr-egate demand nnor-e than tine change in taxes, hut does mnot affect the deficit.'
Despite tine baianced-budget multiplier, tine stance of fiscal policy today is often associated with, and fm'equentlv measured by, the size of tine fedem-ai budget deficit.' Thus, in this article, deficit spending and the starnce of fiscal policy will be treated as synonynnous. Fur'then-more, since they both produce the sarnne qualitative slnift in aggr-egate demnnand, no distinction will he nnade between deficits that arise fiom increases in gover-nment spernding and those that result fi-om tax reductions.
Cyclical and Structural Deficits and Discretionary Fiscal Polkv
It is important to diffen-entiate between "cyclical" and "str-uctural" deficits when examining the effects of pohcy changes on the ecornomy. Tax revenues rise dur-irng the expansiomn phase of the busimness cycle annd fail during the comntr'action phase; in contr-ast, cer-tain governnnnemnt expenditon-es e.g., unemployment cornnpensationi fail dun'-irng expansions arid r-ise during contractions. These counntem'-cyclic:al components of the deficit-tine so-called automatic stabilizer-s--are intended to smnnootln cyclical swirngs in imnconre, Tine str-uctur-ai deficit, on tine other-lnarnd, reflects discretionary fiscal policy act ions! It is the part of tine deficit tlnat is inyar-iarnt to tine pinase of the businness cycle, Chart 1 presemnts measures of the actual and cyclically adjusted budget deficit. Although these rneasur-es depart substamntially at tirnnes, gernem-ally they rinove togetiner. Whiie the anais'sis inn tinis paper-applies equaHy well to cyclical and structural deficits, fr'ornn mow on tIne discussion will focus solely on structural deficits,
THE NET BENEFITS FROM DEFICIT SPENDING
Tine effectiyeness of deficit spernding depends on two factors: the slope of tine aggregate supply curve and tine extent to winich deficit spendimng shifts the aggn'egate demand curve. These factor-s ar-e discussed in detail un latter-sections of the paper. Inn this section, we pn-esetnt somnne gelner-ai notions under-lying the view that society can be a net beneficiary fr'om deficit spemnding.
'lie itnitial populal-itv of usinng deficit spending to increase output was based on the belief that tine market econolnly is unable to sustairn aggr-egate cielnnamnd at a le~•'eiconsistent with ftrii-ennpiovnnnemnt outptrt. This idea of per-sistennt innnempiovnnent is iHustr-ated in cinar-t 2 wlnicin sinows a gap between act rnal and ''p0 tern tial '' r-eai output.' 'line 'There is a well-known caveat to this statement. Government tax rate changes are not neutral. The government may change certain marginal tax rates and simultaneously alter government expenditures to produce no net effect on aggregate demand, all other things constant. The ultimate effect on aggregate output, however, need not be neutral; the non-neutrality of the tax rate change could produce changes in aggregate supply.
Such analysis underlies much of the recent work by Auerbach and Kotlikoft (1987) and Kotlikoff (1988) . Consequently, they have challenged the usual convention of associating deficit spending with fiscal policy. For example, Kotlikofl (1988), pp. 489-90, states that",., fiscal policies can matter a lot, but deficits may nonetheless tell us nothing useful about the true stance of fiscal policy." They argue that, within their lifecycle model, the labels "taxes" and "spending" are arbitrary. For them, a tight fiscal policy occurs when a larger burden of "government consumption" is borne by current rather than future generations. 'Aggregate demand increases because the marginal propensity to spend of the public sector (1) is greater than the marginal propensity to spend of the private sector (<1). If the private sector's marginal propensity to spend is large, the difference between the marginal propensities will be small and so, too, will be the effect of tax-financed expenditures on aggregate demand.
'It is common to measure fiscal action by the full-employment budget surplus or deficit. For a discussion of this, see Carison (1987) and Seater (1985) .
See de Leeuw and Holloway (1983) for a detailed discussion of these concepts and Fellner (1982) for a critique of these measures. For a discussion of these concepts and a breakdown of the deficit, see Erceg and Bernard (1988) . 'There is an issue, not taken up here, about the extent to which such unemployment is "involuntary." According to the usual textbook definition, involuntary unemployment occurs when individuals are willing to work at the market wage but are unable to find employment; that is, when there is an excess supply of labor at the market wage rate, If the market is comp etitive, the wage rate should fall to eliminate the involuntary unemployment. Hence, nearly all theories of involuntary unemployment require some form of nominal or real wage rigidity.
In early Keynesian models, involuntary unemployment was due to nominal rigidities in wages. This explanation requires real wages to fall when output rises. Empirical evidence, how' ever, suggests that real wages are pro-cyclical. Recently, research by "New Keynesian Economists" suggests that persistent under-employment equilibria and involuntary unem' ployment can result from nominal price rigidities in the output market because of monopolistically competitive firms, and because of rigidities in real wages due to "efficiency wages." See Blinder (1988 ), Mankiw (1988 ), Rotembung (1987 . Prescoft (1987) 
Deficit Spending and Capital Accumulation
Deficit spending couid have a secondary effect on the n-ate of economic growth. Production of n-cal output lyl is related to factor inputs, labor INI amid capital IKI, via a production functiorn, that is, y = fINK), The man-ginal pr-oducts of both labor-and capital am-c positive: for any quantity of capital (labor-I, output incr-eases as more labor-tcapitall is used. The growth of the labor forte is often considered synonymous with populatiomn gr-owth, which is deternnitned in part by factor-s that an'e independent of economic considerations. The size of the capitai stock, on the othem' hand, is usually assumnied to her-elated to econoninic factors. The higher the rate of capital formation I investmentl, tine higher the n-ate of economic growth.
Firms deter-nnine the most pnofitable level of output and, simultaneously, the optimal capitai/ labor natio, Because of the nature of capital goods, the decision to acquire capital is based lamong other thingsi on expectations of output gn-owth. if the market economny is subject to pr-olonged periods of unemployment and slow gr-owth because of insufficient demand, expectations for output growth and investment will be lower than if these periods did not occur'. If deficit spending raises the path of reai output over what it would acinieve otherwise, investment and, thereby, potential reai output growth shouid rise even higher. 'l'hus, deficit spending could pi-oduce a inigher rate of actual annd potential gr-owth because of irncr'eased capital fon-matiorn!
Deficits and Symmetric Business Cycles
The gains inn output discussed so far ar-c pn'edicated on tine assumption that cyclical swings in output an-ounnd its potential patin an-e asvmmnetn-ic: cyclical downturns an-e longer' atid nnor'e prornoinnced tinarn cyclical upturns. Since we ar-e assumninng that cvchcai swings ar-c due to van'iationn in tine denianid for goods and services, tins nnearns that increases in tine demand for' goods annd ser--vices an-c less fi-equent amnd smaHer than decreases, if', on tIne other-harnd, fluctuations in aggregate demarnd an-ound potential otrtput ar-c syrnmnnetr-ic, periods dur-inng winich output is above or below tine potential path also nyili be synnnnetn'ic. "'l'his is illustrated by path 1 in figun-e I annd by the aggr-egate demand and supply curves inn figur-e 2. Civern tine slope of the aggmegate supply cur-ye, synnnnetr-ic variation in aggr'egate demand pr-oduces symmetmic moyements in output about the potemntial level, y' On average, then-c are no "net output" gains to be achieved fi-om deficit spending over the cycle. Pen-iods of deficit spending whetn the economy is below the fuli-emnpioyment path would be matched by periods of budget sur-pius when output is above the patin, so the budget would be balanced oven the cycle and the avet-age output level would be the same as with no fiscal action.
Society still may benefit, however-, if the goven-rnment runs deficits duritng the contnaction pinase of the cycle and sun-pluses during expansions. A cyclically balanced budget could stabilize aggnegate demand and n-educe the variability in output; this is iHustrated by path 2 in figur'e 1."
The Benefits From Stable Output
More stable output couid n-educe the risk associated wilh capital inyestment and, as a resuit, imncrease investment,' Consequently, the capital 'Achieving a higher rate of economic growth was part of the fiscal policy agenda during the 1960s, See Levy (1963) .
"Recently, Sickel (1988) has investigated the asymmetry of the business cycles. He tests for both the "steepness" and "deepness" of post-World War II cycles and finds evidence that cyclical troughs are deeper than cyclical peaks. "This discussion implicity assumes that deficit spending does not alter the path of y, i.e., that deficit spending merely dampens the cycle. "Many authors merely assert that there are benefits from more stable output growth without identifying these gains, e.g., Modigliani (1986a Modigliani ( ), (1986b and Bossons (1986) . At other times explanations of these gains sound hollow. For example, Bruce and Purvis (1986) , pp. 60-61, argue for the benefits of avoiding a cyclical downturn by stating that "a government deficit will provide some stimulus to the economy and hence help reduce the dead-weight costs of unemployment that would have occurred in the absence of the deficit." In the case where the government runs a surplus in order to prevent an economic boom, they argue that the surplus helps "avoid the deadweight costs that again arise because the economy is away from its long-run equifibriunn." (Italics added.) Additional benefits could anise if mon-c stable output gn-owth results in mon-c stable consumption. Economists usually argue that people maximize the utility of their consumption over some planning horizon and that the utility gains fn-om increased consumption an-c smaller-than the losses fionn equally probabie decreases in consumption.' 4 Even if the distribution of shocks to income and, therefore, consumption are svmnnetnic, the distnibution of utility gains and losses will be asymmetric. Consequently, the expected utility of consumption rises as income is stabilized.
The Benefits from Stabilizing Nominal GNP
There are additiomnal benefits from stabilizing aggregate demand if cyclical movements in nonninal GNP ar-c symmetn'ic, but cyclical movements in reai output ar-c asymmetnic. That is, the aggregate stnppiy curve is mon-c steeply sloped above potential output as in figure 3 . In this case, randonn yaniation in aggtegate demand would produce lan-gem' changes in real output below the potential output level than above it. Of course, the change in nominal spending above and below potential output nnust be the same if var-iations i.n aggr'egate demand ane symmetric about the natum'al nate. Stabilizing discretionary fiscal policy reduces both inflation and unemployment oven the cycle and, thus, the cost of lost output associated with unemployment and the cost of inflation." Finaflv, deficit spending could yield net benefits if it merely offsets downward shifts in aggr-egate dennand. For-example, assunne that cyclical swings in i-cal output are symmetric so that them-c an-c no output gains on aver-age over the cycle fr-onn stabilizing aggregate demand. Deficit spending still could r-esuit in net output gains for society, if de-"The issue is whether the growth rate of real output is made permanently higher. Certainly, if economic stabilization policy merely causes the level of real output to be higher but does not affect the rate of real output growth permanently, there would still be a period immediately following the enactment of stabilization policy in which the observed rate of real output growth would exceed the full-employment growth rate, "That is, the utility function is concave. Such gains from economic stabilization have been suggested by New Keynesian economics. See Rotemburg (1987), p. 83. To illustrate this point, assume that consumption is a random variable that is uniformly distributed on the closed interval Ito 2, and let the utility of consumption be the simple concaved function, u = C'. In this case, the expected value of utility is 1.22. Now assume that income and, hence, consumption are more variable, but with the same expected value, Specifically. assume that consumption is now uniformly distributed on the closed interval 0 to 3. In this case, the expected value of utility of consumption is reduced to 1.15. Hence, reducing the variability of consumption increases the expected (average) utility of consumption. Of course, consumption may fluctuate much less than output over the business cycle if the life-cycle or permanent income theories of consumption are correct, "The costs of expected inflation are in terms of its effects on long-term bond markets, the misallocation of productive resources and its effects on regulations, The casts of unexpected inflation are primarily in terms of its redistribution of wealth. For a discussion of these costs, see Leijonhufvud (1987) 
CRITICISMS OF THE ALLEGED BENEFITS OF DEFICIT SPENDING
As we have seen, the gains from deficit spending consist of reducing "lost" output due to reduced employment, increasing the growth n-ate of real output or stabilizing output and consumption. To achieve tinese gains, deficit spending must shift the aggregate demand schedule and the aggregate supply curve must be upward-sloping, at least in tine short run. If the aggn-egate supply curve were vertical, shifts in the aggr-egate demand schedule would not affect output. Consequently, then-c could be no output gains from offsetting shifts in aggregate demand. Of course, if the aggregate supply curve were positively sloped, deficit spending would be effective only if it succeeds in shifting the aggregate demand curve. Attacks on the efficacy of fiscal policy have focused, then'efore, on tine slope of tine aggm'egate supply curve amnd the ability of deficit spending to shift aggn-egate demand."
Asymmetric Cyclical Variation in Output
l3oth the Great Depression of tine 1930s and the rise of Keynesian economics, with its emphasis on underennplovnnernt equilibrium, led to the acceptance of the nnotion that the man-ket economy is neither' able to sustain a full-ennployment level of output nor able to move back to it quickly whnen aggregate demand failures occur." Prior-to Keynes, it was commonly believed that output wouid naturally move to the level consistent with no involuntary unemployment. While shocks to either aggnegate dennand or supply might cause tennpomamp eriods of unemployment, resources wer-e thought to be sufficiently mobile and wages and prices sufficiently flexible that the economy would return to its full-employment equilibr-iurn fairt' quickly.
Kenes argued that the economy might r-emain permanently below its full-employment level because of insufficient aggregate demand and nnarket imperfections."' This below-full-employment equilibrium r-equir-es an upward-sloping aggn-egate supply curve. Typically, it was also angued that the aggregate supply curve would become steeper around the flaIl-employment level of output, like the aggregate supply curve in figure 3.
The Phillips Curve
The Keynesian view was strengthened by the discovery ofwhat appeared to be a stabie long-r-un empirical relationship between the rate of inflation and the unemployment rate; this m'elationnship was calied the Phillips Curve." If unennpio~-ment was too high relative to the full-employment ratef, policymakers couid achieve a per-manent increase in output by increasing aggi-egate dennand through deficit spending. The cost would be a permanent increase in inflation. The extent of the cost is deter-mined by the slope of the Phillips Curve. The closer-income was to its full- Many economists argue that there is no such thing as persistent unemployment because the market economy eventually will adiust to the point at which the labor market clears, Keynes himself almost certainly believed this to be true in the long run; however, he regarded the long run to be too long for the ad justment to be left to market forces alone. His much-quoted defense of his view was that",,, in the long run we are all dead," "'This apparent empirical regularity was first discovered by Phillips (1958) who used wages and unemployment. 
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employment level, the steeper the slope and, consequently, the higinet-the inflation nate, Presumably, without deficit spending, the economy would he stuck pen-manently below the fullemployment level of output.
The iVatural Rate Hypothesis and Rational Expectations: A Counter View to the Phillips Curve
The view that the economy could remain per--manentlv at underennpiovrnnent equihbr-ium was challenged by tine Natur-al Rate Hypothesis?' It reintt-oduced the otnce-pr'evalent argument that the economy eventually will retur-n to its fuilemployment equilibrium. Tlnat is, the Natun-al Rate Hypothesis implied that the long-run Phillips Curve is ver-tical at the natunal rate of unennpioyment.
The implications of the Natural Rate Hypothesis were enhanced by the r-ational expectations n-evolution, which argued for' the same conclusions, albeit along different theoretical lines, Rational expectations tnodels of the busirness cycle showed tinat systennatic stabilization policies could inot attect real output per-manentlĩn tnarkets populated by "r-ational" individuals,"
Both tineories at-gue that the ennplo~mernt n-ate will tend toward its natural rate; consequently, demand management policies will be unabie to keep the unempioynnent n-ate below the natural rate in the long run, The natur-al rate of output, y,,, is determined soiely by the level of employment N,,, consistent with the natural rate of unemployment, given the stock of capital K. That is, y,, = fL,, 1(1. Sitnce demand managennent policies have mo lastimng effect on employnnent or-the capital stock, they have no effect on the natural rate of output. In effect, these theories make it less likely that then-c will be asymnnetn-ies in the business cycle, thus, eliminating the possibility of permanent gains in net output from deficit spending. Unless shocks to demand or supply are asymmetric, on average, cyclical downtur-ns need be no more pronounced nOn' of longer-dutation than cyclical upturns."
The Natural Rate Hypothesis asserts that the long-t-un aggregate supply curve is vertical at an output level consistent with the natural rate of unemployment. It does not asser-t, howeven-, that the short-run aggregate supply curve will be vertical at this level of output." Hence, accepting the Natur-al Rate Hypothesis does not imply that society cannot benefit from appropriately timed and irnplennented deficit spending; however, it limits significantly the benefits that society can r-eceive fiom deficit spending. As discussed previously, society benefits only if deficit spending reduces cyclical swings in output or nominal GNP.' 1
CAN DEFICIT SPENDING SHIFT THE AGGREGATE DEMAND SCHEDULE?
Even when the aggr-egate supply curve fshort-or long-runf is upward-sloping, deficit spending will have little effect on output or prices if the incnease in aggtegate demand that it produces is lar-gely offset by a deficit-induced decnease in private spending, that is, if deficit spending fails to change aggregate demand.
Competition for Credit-Indirect Crowding Out Through Interest Rates
When the goven-mnment nuns a deficit, it issues government debt," Thus, the demand for-credit increases n-dative to the supply. All other-things "See Friedman (1968) and Phelps (1967) . "Neither the Natural Rate Hypothesis nor many rational expectations models give rise to involuntary unemployment as defined in footnote 8. Many rational expectations models, however, give rise to cyclical movements in the natural rate of unemployment. See Fischer (1977), Taylor (1988) and McCallum (1986) . For a list of other factors that could cause the unemployment rate to change without involuntary unemployment, see Blinder (1988) . "In chart 2, "potential" output is defined arbitrarily. Consequently, persistent unemployment can exist by definition. This applies to estimates of "potential" GNP as well as cyclicallyadjusted deficits, etc. See Fellner (1982) and de Leeuw and Holloway (1982) for a discussion of this point. "Also, it does not say explicitly what the lever of the natural rate is. See Carlson (1988) for a discussion of the level of the natural rate, "'Actually, in such models, deficits can provide benefits in the absence of stabilizing output. These benefits come from smoothing taxes over the cycle. Public finance theory asserts that variation in tax rates across goods or activities results in welfare losses under most conditions, Consequently, it would be more efficient to run deficits and surpluses over the business cycle rather than balance the budget annually by altering tax rates, See Bossons (1986) and the references cited there.
"'In models with a government budget constraint deficits are often financed directly through money creation, Given the current institutional structure, however, the government must initially issue debt even if it is subsequently monetized. See Thornton (1 984a). See Thornton (1 984b) for a discussion of and evidence on debt monetization, 
Deficit Spending and the Trade Dçficit
Assuming that deficit spending increases the demand for credit, its effect on interest rates depends on whether-tine economy is "open" or' "closed." In the preceding example, we implicitã ssumed that the economy was closed so that the government ran a deficit by borrowing from the private sector, In an open economy with a floating exchange rate and perfect capital flows, the results would be somewhat different."' An increase in the budget deficit puts upward pressure on domestic interest rates. 'rhis leads to inflows of financial capital and an appreciation of the exchange rate. This appreciation, together' with the higher domestic demand, is associated with a current account deficit in the balance of payments. In effect, the government deficit is financed by a larger tr-ade deficit." The econnomy nnav gain in terms of higher-shofl-term consumption, hut at a cost of an increase in exter-nal debt.
'I'he decline in private expenditunes is affected through higher interest rates, a larger tn-ade deficit or botln, In any event, the i-esult is the sanne: the gr-oup that gains directly fi-om deficit expenditur-es does so at the expense of those who lose, with little or-no net increase in aggregate dennand. 'tine only differ-ence is that those who gain dir-ectly ar-c nnoi-e r-eadily identified than those who suffer indirect losses thr'omngh higlner-interest r-ates or uncr-eased fom-eign claims on U.S. assets."
Ricardian .Equivalence
Another argument, referred to as the "Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis," holds that deficit spending cannot shift the aggregate demandc losed-economy conclusion that deficit spending does not crowd-out private spending directly implies that government debt is net wealth to society. In other-words, when the government issues debt to purchase goods and services, the holder-of the debt views it as an asset; but the taxpayer-does not view it as a liability for, at least, views it as a smaller-liabilityf. That is, individuals believe that they will not have to pay current or-future taxes to service or retir-e the debt.
""This problem cannot be solved by monetizing the debt, The increased rate of money growth will result merely in a higher rate of inflation and, hence, higher nominal interest rates, Many advocates of countercyclical fiscal policy view this as one of the most serious drawbacks to deficit spending. See Modigliani (1986b) .
"'This argument ignores how the deficits are spent. Recently, Heilbroner (1988) has argued that deficit spending is necessary to finance the purchase of public capital, that is, infrastructure, Other economist (for example, see Sturrock and Idan (1988) ) argue that the real burden of deficits comes only when they are used to finance current consumption. This does not establish the desirability of deficit spending; it merely asserts that spending for infrastructure capital may increase the rate of economic growth, depending primarily on the relative productivity of the factor resources in the two sectors and on the productivity of public versus private capital.
The idea that such expenditures should be financed by deficits rests largely on the long-lived nature of capital goods. Since these capital goods provide services over a number of years, it is argued that public sector capital goods should be financed by borrowing just as businesses or households finance their acquisition of durable goods. In the case of businesses, however, debt service is financed out of the increased earnings that the capital goods are expected to provide. In the case of households, deficit financing is used to better match the desired consumption with expected future income. Hence, households, too, expect to service the debt through higher incomes, No similar increased earnings necessarily accrues from the acquisition of public capital. Income will increase only if the marginal product of public capital is larger than that of private capital. This is a difficult point to establish, Proponents of this view point to the productivity gains that could accrue from public expenditures on education and the like; however, these services could be provided by the private sector. Hence, this argument is about the appropriate role for government and public goods. See Aschauer and Greenwood and Aschauer (1988a, band c) for a discussion of the benefits from social infrastructure expenditures. Hence, the only real argument for deficit financing of such expenditures is that it would equalize their costs and benefits across generations. This implies, however, that the increased indebtedness that such expenditures necessitate will eventually be retired through increased taxes unless the infrastructure acquired is infinitely lived, "'The assumption of perfect capital flows means that domestic real interest rates could not rise above world levels without inducing an inflow of financial capital from overseas, For a situation in which there is no expectation of exchange rate changes, this means that domestic and foreign nominal interest rates must be equal. "See Mundell (1963) . This result assumes no change in monetary policy to accommodate the defict, "'in this model, the real market value of government debt is part of society's net wealth, In the closed economy model, at the natural rate of unemployment, the increase in wealth resulting from the increase in nominal debt due to deficit spending is just offset by a decline in wealth due to higher prices, interest rates or both, In the open economy model, it is offset by a reduced stock of national wealth due to increased claims by foreigners on U.S. assets. "Technically, Ricardian Equivalence argues that, for a given level of government expenditures, aggregate demand will not change as the government switches from tax to bond financing. As O'Driscoll (1977) points out, Ricardo was merely offering this as a theoretical possibility and did not himself believe it, Rican-dian Equivalence, on the other hand, asserts that public and private debt are perfect substitutes. lnndMduals believe tinat tlney or' tineir heirs will have to pay taxes equal to the deficit-financed expenditures, so an mci-ease in present value of tine expected future taxes just equals the current deficit.
At the macroeconomic level, Ricardian Equivalence implies that deficit spending will not be associated with increases in real interest rates, output, prices or the tr-ade deficit." Consequently, the Ricandian view yields a radically different notion of the national debt. For those who believe in the benefits of deficit spending, the national debt, which is the accumulated deficits, should be viewed as a blessing, not a curse. For those who believe in Ricardian Equivalence, deficit spending merely results in a redistribution of income and the national debt represents the cumulative amount of this net transfer,
Can Discretionary Fiscal Policy Be Successfully Implemented?
There is also an argument against the usefulness of deficit spending that is independent of its ability to shift aggregate demand. It is critically dependent, however, on the Natural Rate Hypothesis and on whether shifts in aggregate demand caused by other-factors are temporary or permanent. It has been suggested that policymakers do not have the information needed to offset shifts in aggi-egate demand to stabilize output." This argument is usually couched in a discussion of the lags in economic policymaking. For fiscal policy, the most important of these are the "recognition" and "implementation" lags. The recognition tag is the time between when a need for-corrective action arises fan exogenous shift in aggregate demandf and when policymakers recognize the need-The issue is simply whether policymakers know where the economy is in the business cycle at any particular point in time.
The implementation lag is the tinne between when the need for con-rective action is recognized and when policymaker-s take action. Thus, even if policymakers are quick to recognize that the demand Inas shifted, by tIne time tlney react to the situation, it may have changed and the need for cor-r-ective action nnay have vanished.
This ar-gument is presented gn-aphically in figun-e 4a. Assume that the Natural Rate Hypothesis holds and that the slnor-t-run aggregate supply curve is symmetric around the level of output consistent with the natural n-ate of unemployment. Assume fur-ther' an exogenous decr-ease in aggregate dennand, shifting it fiotn AD to AD'. Now if policymaken-s did not react to the shift in demand immediately, the process of adjustment toward the natur-al rate would begin; the price level would decline and the quantity of output demanded would increase. Once policvnnakers reacted to the problem by increasing deficit spending, they would shift the aggregate demand curve upwan-d, bringing output back to its natum-al-nate level.
tf the shift in aggregate demand were temporary, a delay in policy might actually exacerbate the situation if deficit spending coincided closely with the return of aggnegate demand to its former level. This is illustrated in figure 4b , where the simultaneous increase in deficit spending and the return of aggregate demand to its former level shift aggregate demand to AD".
Of course, if the decline in aggregate demand were permanent, the timing of policy would be less important. Deficit spending eventually would move the economy back to the natutal rate; the timing of the policy action would determine only how quickly deficit spending moved the economy back to its full-employment potential. Of course, the economy would move back eventually to full ennployment even without deficit spending.
Demand or Supp~yDisturbances
Another problem is that policvmakers must be able to differentiate between demand-and supplyside disturbances. Recently, some have suggested that business cycles can be explained solely by supply-side disturbances. Indeed, some "real business cycle" models have successfully produced cyclical swings in output that mimic real won-Id data. Whether all cyclical swings in economic activity can be explained by such models is the subject of intense debate. Nevertheless, to the extent that some cyclical swings are the result of supply-side shocks, fiscal policy can succeed in stabilizing output only by exacerbating moveintents in pr-ices for it can help stabilize the price level only by exacerbating movements in output I.
"Analysts frequently argue that Ricardian Equivalence must be invalid because the necessary microeconomic conditions for its validity are so stringent that they cannot possibly be satisfied.
For example, see Buiter (1985) . Also, see McCallum (1984) .
"It is argued that inappropriately timed policy might destabilize the economy. See Friedman (1968) .
Figure 4 The Timing of Changes in Fiscal Policy
Consequently, policvrnnaker-s must know not only wher-e in the business cycle the economy is at any point in time, but whether its position was caused by a shift in aggregate demand, aggregate supply or, perhaps, simply the cyclical dynamics of the economy, unrelated to exogenous disturbances in either-aggregate demand or supply. In short, some would argue that the information required to use discretionary fiscal policy effectively is simply too great.
WHAT IS THE EVIDENCE?
Assessing the evidence on discretionary fiscal policy is difficult. Effective discretionary fiscal policy implies that output should be mor-e stable and suggests that perhaps the rate of real output growth should be higher on average when fiscal policy was used aggressively. it also suggests that deficit spending should be positively cor-related with interest rates, p1-ices for inflationf or trade deficits.
A number of lam-ge-scale econometric models suggest that fiscal policy has significant slnort-mun and, in some cases, long-n-un effects, Estimates of r-educed-form models, however-, typically show no long-run effects of deficit spending and, often, only weak short-run effects." Hence, such nnodels essentially substantiate the Natun-al Rate Hypothesis. These studies an-e subject to consider-able controversy because of the difficulty in finding commonly accepted variables that ieflect discretionary changes in fiscal policy and the continued contr-over-sy over-reduced-for-m estimation.
The greatest challenge to the orthodox view of deficit spending comes fiom the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis." Macr-oecononnic evidence from thn-ee recent surveys is largely cotnsistent with the Ricardian view." In general, there is no statistically significant relationship between structural deficits and interest rates or inflation, or between the budget and trade deflcits.7 These results ane bolster'ed by won-k that shows a high negative correla-"One of the earliest of these was the Andersen-Jordan equation, See Andersen and Jordan (1968) . "'See Barro (1987) , Bernheim (1987) and Aschauer (1988a) . For more recent studies which report results consistent with Ricardian Equivalence, see Evans (1988) , Koray and Hill (1988) and Leiderman and Razin (1988) . 
The Evidence on Stabilization
One commonly cited piece of evidence that demand management can stabilize the economy is a comparisorn of the volatility of U.S. output, unemployment and industrial pr-oduction, before and after-Won-Id War 11. 'I'he fact that the pr-c-war series ar-c nnore volatile than tine post-war-semies has been cited as evidence of both tlne inherernt instability of unmanaged capitalism and the success of demand nnarnagement policies in stabilizing tine econoniy.
There am-c several criticisnns of this evidence. First, pre-and post-war data vary in terms of a quality and uniformity. Indeed, some argue that the excessive pr-c-war volatility of the commonly used series on unemployment, GNP aind industrial production is due to vamious quit-ks in their-construction."' Second, even if the post-war-economy is mon-c stable, this may be due to other changes in econonnic fumndamentals, not to discr-etionary fiscal policy pen se." Furthermore, even if fiscal policy is n-esponsible for-the apparent~mome stable postwar-econonny, this maybe the rt'sult of increased relevance on the autonnatic stabilizers, not to discn-etionary fiscal policy.
Also, post-wan-i-cal output gn'owth in the United States is below its pr-c-war gr-owtin. 'Tine discn-epancy is even langer if the Depression year-s al-c onnitted." Mon-cover-, there has been a secular-rise in the uneniployment i-ate. These adverse movennents roughly coincide with a secular-rise iii the U.S. str-uctur'al deficit." Hence, if tIne mon-c stable post-war economy is used as evidence on the success of fiscal policy, the associated slower-output gm-owth and iniglner unennplovment must be consider'ed the costs of stability, CONCLUSION This paper has examined the theoretical ar-guments about the wisdom of deficit spending. The once-prevalent Keynesian approach, which concludes that such gains clearly exist, has come under-attack. Increasingly, both theoretical innovations and empirical evidence suggest that moder-n economies are not well chan-acter-ized by the Keynesian view. Support for the Natural Rate Flypothesis, which amgues that deficit spending has no effect on the equilibrium level of output and employment in the long run has gi-owin. If this hypothesis is valid, the gains fi-om deficit spending result from stabilizing output around the level consistent with the natunal rate of unemployment. Such an effective use of deficit spending, however, irnnposes information requirements on policvmakers that ar-c unlikely to be attained. in gener-al, empirical evidence on the effects of deficit spending is sparse and, for-the most part, ambiguous. Most persuasive is the growing macroecononnic evidence, consistent with Ricat-dian Equivalence, that deficit spending has no long-run effect. The challenge for those who ar-gue that deficit spending merely redistributes income and that stabilization policy will likely hurt is to explain phenomena like the Great Depression. Through adherents to both extreme Keynesian and extreme rational expectations views (and cvervthing betweenf usually are able to rationalize historical events on their-own terms, the Great Depr-ession is as likely to be seen as an example of what bad policy can create as it is of what good policy can emadicate. "'Of course, in a closed economy with output unchanged, the public sector deficit must equal the private sector surplus.
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